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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOAN B. l\IOORE,
Plaintif f-Rc0 pondcnt,
vs.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF AMERICA,
Vcfcndcmt-Appellant.

·Case No.

12388

AMICUS CUHIAB
OF THE EQUITABL]j_J
AS8PRANCE SOCIETY OF THE
STATES
STATEMEN1-1 OF THE SCOPE OF THIS BRIEF
This Amicus Curiae Brief is submit.ted in support
of defendant-appellant Prudential's Petition for rehearing of its appeal. It is limited to that portion of the
Court's opinion which indicates that the test of materiality under Section 31-19-8 U.C.A. 1953, as amended Chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1963, is what:
"those Pngag·ed in the insurance busin<:>ss, acting
in accordance with the
reasonably and
usual practic(' among imrnrance companies . . .
would have done had they known the truth . "
1

as declared by this Court in Burnham, v. Banker's Life
and Casualty Co., 24 U. 2d 277, 470 P2d 261, rather than
what "the insurer" would have done. We understand
tha;t no oral argument was presented on the appeal, and
we hope, with this Brief, to aid the Court in exploring
this phase of the statute which is important to the insurance industry as a whole. This is the first case in which
the Court has an opportunity to interpret Section 31-19-8,
U.C.A. since the 1963 revision.
In the Burnham case this Court recognized that the
case was governed by the statute in effect when the. policy
was issued in 1962. That Section was repealed by the
current statute. See Chapter 45, Section 3, Page 251,
Laws of Utah 1963.
The Moore case on the, other hand involves a policy
issued in 1967 and is governed by the present statute pertaining to the materiality of misrepresentations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UTAH
INSURANCE CODE
1

Following the decision in 1934 by the Supreme Court
of the United States in U.S. v. Southeastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 64 Sup.
Ct. 1162, reh. den. 323 US 811, 89 L.Ed. 646, 65 Sup. Ct.
26, Congress passed laws declaring that the states could
regulate the insurance industry. These laws also provide
that if the states failed to regulate the industry effective-
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ly, federal statutes would govern. 59 Stat. 33-34; 15 USCA 1011, 1012 and 1013. In this setting, all strutes and
territories of the Union took immediate steps to revise
their insurance sta:tutes extensively; in most cases complete new codes were prepared and adopted. At that time
the 27th Legislature of Utah adopted a new insurance
code, Chapter 63 Laws of Utah 1947.
In the 34th Legislaiture in 1961, SJR 10 was adopted.
It provides that an interim insurance committee be created to review the insurance code and propose revisions
to the 35th Legislature. Laws of Utah 1961, page 575.
Conway Ashton, Esq., of Salt Lake City, Utah, now
President, Counsel·and a Director of the Beneficial Life
Insurance Company was on the Interim Insurance Committee which was appointed in 1961 to revise the Utah
Insurance Code. There were six Olther members of that
Committee, including the Attorney General and the Insurance Commi:;;sioner. That Committee repor.ted to then
Governor George D. Clyde in November 1962 that iit had
investigated the laws, court decisions and regulations
of the United Staites and of other states having to do
with insurance, specifically such laws and regulations as
had been newly
or extensively revised. The report said that particular attention was given to the laws
of Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Delaware, which were
revised during the years 1959 through 1962 and were
now favorably looked upon by the public officials and by
members of the insurance industry.

3

The Committee pointed out to the Governor that
there had been so many changes in the business of insurance in the intervening 16 years since the Code had been
adopted, that, in many respects, the then present Code
was not adequate. See also 4 Utah Law Review 456. In
some instances, it was found advisable to rewrite sections
within chapters while, in others, rephrasing was found
adequate. Before new chapters were written a thorough
study was made of similar provisions in recently adopted
codes in other states. The changes and corrections proposed by the Committee affected 30 of the 34 chapters of
the Code. The Legislature passed the amendments on
March 14, 1963, effective July 1, 1963, Chapter 45 Laws
of Utah 1963. The new sections of the Code included
31-19-8, on misrepresentations, and the old section under
that number was repealed.
Arizona was the first state to adopt the new form
of misrepresentation statute. The Arizona Code revision,
as well as those of Arkansas, Florida, Idaho and Montana, were drafted by Robert D. Williams, Esq., of
Olympia, Washington. Apparently, Mr. vVilliams also
acted as a consultant to the Alaska Code revision group.
After that, the other states listed below and Puerto Rico,
incorporated the "Williams" misrepresentation statute,
including Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, Utah, West
Virginia, and more lately Nevada and Alabama, both of
which amended their codes in 1971, effective January 1,
1972.
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rrhe present Utah statute on the materiality of misrepresentations, refers to "the insurer" in subdivisions
(1) (b) and (c). Upon reoommendation of the interim
committee, this provision adopted practically verbatim
the language of the new Idaho statute on this point. This
statute is also praotically identical with the statutes of
the following other states and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico on this subject :
Alaska .......................................... (21.42.10) -1966
Arizona ........................................ ( 20-1109) - 1954
Arkansas .................................... ( 66-3208) - 1959
Florida ........................................ (627.01081) -1959
Georgia ............................. :.......... (56-2409) - 1960
Idaho ............................................ ( 41-1811) -1961
Maryland .................................... (48A-347) -1963
Montana ...................................... (40-3713) -1959
Oklahoma .................................... (36-3609) -1957
South Dakota ............................ (58-11-44) -1966
West Virginia .........•.................. (33-6-7)
-1957
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico(26-1110) -1957
Alabama ...................... ,............... (28-426c) -1971
-1971
Nevada ........................................ (16-384)
Other states with language substantially the same as
that of the Utah statute generally hold that the test of
materiality is satisfied by the testimony of the insurer's
Medical Director that, if the true and complete facts had
been disclosed in the application, the policy would not
have been issued.
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POINT I
THE PRUDENT INSURER RULE vs. THE INDIVIDUAL
INSURER RULE.

In the Burnham case, supra, this Court recognized
that the 1963 revision of the Utah Insurance Code repealed the existing Code in part. This occurred not only
in Utah but in other sta:tes as well, as
in
the case ti! law. Our research reveals that state::; other
than Utah, which have adopted substantially if not
identically, the language of Section 31-19-8, U.C.A. as
amended in 1963, have construed the section as requiring
the "individual insurer" test of the materiality of misrepresentations rather than the "prudent insurer" test.
The statute plainly states that nu::;representations
shall not prevent recovery under a policy unless fraudulent, or material to the insurer, or the insurer in good
faith either would not have issued the policy ... or would
not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss if the true facts had been made known
to the insurer. Technically, an underwriter of another insurance company would not be competent to testify as
to what action "the insurer" would have taken on the
application for insurance, under its own rules and practices, if certain facts had been disclosed.
Each insurer has its own underwriting rules and
practices and it is unrealistic for the courts to presume
that a uniform standard of materiality exists in the
insurance industry.
6

A person whose application might be declined for
health reasons by one company, might be approved or
issued substandard insurance by another. F'or example,
one insurer may be fairly liberal on signs of kidney ailments and very strict on heart symptoms; another may
be just the reverse. The prudent insurer test would subject both to a mythical uniform standard. See Patterson,
Essentials of Insurance Law (2d Ed 1957) Sec. 82 page
414-419.
The prudent insurer rule requires the testimony of
experts - underwriters from other insurance companies
-as to what "those engaged in the insurance business,
acting reasonably and naturally in accordance with the
usual practice among insurance companies . . . would
have done had they known the truth... " This pertains
to what they "would have done had they known the truth"
at the time of application. In effect, "the insurer" could
not reject an application or charge a higher premium
within this standard unless this is also done by insurance
companies generally. Charles F. Wilson, Esq., in 73
Dickinson Law Review 250, commented on this. It is
stated at page 263, that:
"Further objection to a criteria for materiality
measured b)' the practice of prudent insurers is
that it unjustifiably compels the insurer to be
bound by general insurance practices. The insurer
in effect cannot reject an application or charge a
higher premium within this standard unless like'lvise is done by insurance companies generally."
This would indeed present an underwriting problem impossible to administer.
7

The prudent insurer rule would restrid "tlH• immrer's" freedom to contract. In practice, it would deteriorate into a battle of expert ·witnesses. See Pacific 111 idiM1l
Life Inswrance Company i·. Arnold, 2G2 Ky 2G7, 90
2d 44.
As to prncedure, it is fundamental that the bmden
is upon the insurer to prove materiality as required by
the statute. Adams v. National Casitalty Co. (Sup. Ct.
Okla. 1957) 307 P2d 5-±2, 5-1:4. This applies both under
the prudent insurer rule and the individual insmer rule.
Under the prudent insurer rule, materiality is established
through the testimony of experts - underwriters of
other insurers - as to what underwriting action insurance companies generally ·would haye taken on the application when it was submitted, had the,\' been informed
the truth. This, of course, brings into play undenvriting
rules and practices of insurers other than "the insurer"
referred to in the statute.
On the other hand, under the indiYidual immrer rule
proof of materiality is established through the testimony
of "the insurer's" medical dirPctor or undenniter. "\Vhcn
the condition is one which is covNed in the "the insurer's"
written underwriting rules, the oral testimony of its
medical director or underwriter would be buttressed
·with portions of its underwriting manual applicable to
the condition involved.
Where the t<'stirnon.\' of "the insurer's" medical
director or underwriter stands uncontradicted, tho insurer is entitled to a directl•d verdict. Em11i1e J,ifc Insur-

a11ce Co. i·. Joues, 14 Ga 647, 82
62; Ettman v. Eqititaule Life, 6 AD 2d 697 aff'd, 5 NY 2d 1005. On the othN
hand, where the testimony is contradicted, the issue of
materiality becomes one of fact to be determined by the
trial of the facts. Jlatthews v. New Y.ork Life 92 Ida 372,
443 p. 2d 456.
There are many ·ways m which the testimonyi of
'"the insurer's" medical director can be contradicted:
l.

Cross-examination.

2.

proceedings, including examination
of the medical director or underwriter before
trial.
Discon-·ry and inspection of the written underwriting manual of ''the insurer."

-±.

1<.Jxmuination before trial or subpoena at trial
of othPr nndt>rwriters of 'the insurer.

All of these }H'O\·icle opportunities to explore the under·writing rnles and practices of "the insurer" and to contradict the testimony of its medical director or underwriter.
POINT II
THE BURNHAM CASE

In its opinion in the instant case, the Court repeats
what it declared in the Burnham case in speaking about
whether a misstatement in an insurance application was
material to the risk. This Court declared in Bitrnharn,
at Page 263 Pac. that "it does not depend upon assertions
9

of the insurer, or of the insured, as to what they may
think about the materiality of the representrution in controversy," and that it "is a question for the jury to determine as to what those engaged in the insurance business, acting reasonably and naturally in accordance with
the usual practice among insurance companies ... would
have done had they known the truth . . . "
The Burnham case involved a policy issued in 1962.
Therefore, it was governed by the predecessor statute
to the current section which was repealed in 1963. For
comparison the predecessor Section 31-19-8 is as follows:
" ( 1)

Except as provided in subsection ( 2), no
oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance contract, by the insured or in his behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat
or avoid the contract or prevent it attaching, unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made with the intent to deceive.
The insured shall havt: the burden of proof
that such misrepresentation or warranty
was not made with intent to deceive.

(2)

In any application for life or disability insurance made in writing by the insured,
all statements therein made by the insured
shall, in the absence of fraud, be deemed
representations and not warranties. The
falsity of a.ny such strutement shall not
bar the right to recovery under the contract
unless it materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed
by the insurer."
1

10

This Court, in its first opinion in the Burnham case declared wha:t amounts to the prudent insurer rule in determining whether the misstatement "was material to
the risk"
There was a second appeal in the Burnham case,
26 U 2d 155, 484 P.2d 155. The court below denied a
Motion for Summary Judgment and this Court affirmed,
stating:
''The issul5to be dete1mined on trial are whether
or not the decedent was guilty of fraud in knowingly and wilfully misstating or withholding facts
from the insurance company for the purpose of
inducing the defendant to reinstate the policy
and whether· or not the defendant was deceived
thereby and reinstated the policy when' it would
not have done so had it known the true situation."
(Emphasis added)
The underlined language seems to satisfy the "individual insurer" rnle, whereas, the language of this
Court in its earlier opinion in the Burnham case indicates
the "prudent insurer" rule.
In the instant case, this Court referred to its opinion
in the first Bitrnham appeal in declaring what is required
to detennine whether a misstatement was "material to the
risk." "Material to the risk" would correspond to subdivision (1) (b) of the present statute. However, there
are three subdivisions to 31-19-8(1), different from one
another and in the disjunctive, any one of which satisfies the requirement of materiality. It may well be the

11

Court's opinion in the instant case that insofar as (1) (b)
of the sta:tute is concerned the prudent insurer rule
applies, but as to ( 1) ( c) the individual insurer rule applies. If such be the case, perhaps this is the occasion to
clarify the matter.
For convenience of the Court, Sec. 31-19-8 U.C.A.
1953, as amended in 1963 is quoted verbatim:"31-19-8. Representations in applications. - ( 1)
All statements and descriptions in any application
an insurance policy or annuity contract, or
for the reinstatement or renewal thereof, by or
in behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be
deemed to be representations and not warranties.
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment or
facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent
a recovery under the policy or contract unless :

for

(a) fraudulent; or
(b) material either to the acceptance of the risk,
or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
( c) the insurer in good faith either would not
have issued the policy or contract, or would
not have issued, reinstated or renewed it at
the same premium rate, or would noit have issued, reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in as large an amount, or would not have
provided coverage \vith respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss, if the true facts had
been made known to the insurer as required
either by the application for the policy or
contract or othenvise.
(2) If, in any action to rescind any policy or
contract, or to recover thereon, any misrepresen12

tation with respect to a medical impairment is
proved by the insurer, and the insured or any
other person having or claiming a right under
the contract shall prevent full disclosure and
proof of the nature of the medical impairment,
the misrepresentation shall be presumed to have
been material."
POINT III
DECISIONS

IN

OTHER

STATES

WITH

SIMILAR

STATUTES.

Arizona
The Arizona Supreme Court has pointed out that
the new statute pertaining to materiality of misrepresentations repealed the prior law on the subject, saying
in Smith v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., (1971)
107 Ariz. 112, 483 P.2d 527 :
"The third subparagraph of ARS Section 20-1109
appears to be a statutory overruling of a 1940
Arizona decision which held 1:hat it was not necessary for an insurer to prove that it would have
rejected the application if it had been given
knowledge of the true facts. See First National
Benefit Society 'l'. Fiske, 55 Ariz. 290, 101 P2d
205 (1940)."
See also Conti11ental Casualty Co. v. Mulligan (1969), 10
Ariz. App. 491, 460 P2d 27 (discussed below); Marine
v. Allstate Insurance Co., (1970) 12 Ariz. App. 229, 469

P.2d 121.
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Arkansas

In Dopson v. M.etropolitan I
Company, 244
Ark. 659, 426 SW 2d 410, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
held the rule that misrepresentation would not void liabitity under a policy unless failure to disclose was
material to the risk involved, was modified under the
new Arkansas statute to the extent that recovery will be
denied where "omissions" or "incorrect statements" are
such that the insurer would not have provided coverage
with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss had it
known the true facts. The Court held that the affidavit
of an underwriter of Metropolitan Life, admitted into
evidence by stipulation, was "competent evidence to
show that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company would
not have provided coverage of Mrs. Dopson had it been
advised of the 1964 back trouble."
In another interesting case, Hartford Life I usura111ce
Company c. Catterson, 247 Ark 263, 445 SW 2d 109, the
Arkansas Supreme Court, said:
"We lay aside without discussion the appellant's
citation of some of our older cases, for the point
at issue is now covered by the Insurance Code,
which provides that
shall not
prevent a recovery unless fraudulent, or mah•rial
to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard,
or of such a nature that the insurer would not
have is::·nwd th<>
it did issuP if the true
facts had ht>t-n made known to it. Ark. Stat.
Ann. Sec. GG-3208 (RPpl. 19GG)

''vVe have examined the new statute at length in
Old Republic Insurance Cu. v. Alexander, 245 Ark
1029, 436 S\V S\V 2d 829 (1969), and reached this
conclusion: 'The burden was on (the insurer) to
sustain its contentions that the facts not disclosed
were material to the risk assumed by it, or that,
it in good faith, would no1t have issued the policy.'
After studying the proof \Ve decided that the
chancellor had not erred in holding that the insurance company had failed to sustain its burden
of showing that it would not have issued the policy
if the truth had been stated in the application.
By contrast, in Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn v.
Smith, 245 Ark. 934, 436 SW 2d 97 ( 1969), we
denied recovery on the policy when it was proved
that knowledge of the applicant's true medical
history would have kept the company from issuing the policy.
"In the case at bar, which was tried before either
of the t\vo opinions just cited had been published,
the insurer offered no evidence to prove that the
policy would not have been issued if the peritinent
question in the application had been answered
correctly. We may assume that a correct answer
would have led the insurance company to investigate the matter, but there is no testimony showing whether or not the company would have refused fo issue the policy because of the applicant's
brief confinement to the State Hospital in 1957.
We are forced to conclude that foe appellant failed
to establish its affirmaJtive defense under the Insurance Code."
It should be noted that in the Dopson case, as well
as in Life and Casualty lnsitrance Co. of Tenn. v. Smith,
supra, the Supreme Court of Arkansas accepted foe

15

testin).ony of "the insurer's" underwriter to satisfy the
test of materiality of the misrepresentations.
In American Family Lif c Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 248
Ark 1303, 455 SW 2d 932, it was held that the e:xclusion
of ,the testimony of "the insurer's" agent to prove it
would not have. issued the policy if the true facts had
been disclosed in the application, constituted reversible
error.

Georgia
In a 1941 case the Georgia Court of Appeals, applying the predecessor statute on materiality, held that
testimony from the individual insurer itself to prove
mate,riality was not admissible. See Metropolitnn Life
Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 65 Ga 697, 16 SE 2d 33.
However, in Kennesaw Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Hubbard, 106 Ga App 556, 127 SE 2d 845, decided after
the statutory change, the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed the history of the Georgia misrepresentations
statutes and then.said of the· current statute:
"But other. and
provisions became effective when the Insurance Code of 1960 ·was
adopted. See Code Sec. 56-2407, 56-2409."
In Jessup v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 117 Ga App. 389, 160
SE 2d 612, another misrepresentation case, the lower
court admitted the testimony of an Assistant Vice President and Claims Director of the insurer that, had it known
the true facts it would not have reinstated the policy. The
Court of Appeal:,; held tha:t the misrepresentations were
material; that materiality is detPrrnined
the inflnence
such knowledge ha:,; on assuming tl1p ri:,;k at the outset.
1G

It was held in National Life and Acc. Insurance Co.
v. Crew, 119 Ga App 573, 168 SE 2d 181, that where the
testimony of the insurer's underwriter has been contradicted, the issue of materiality is for the jury.

Maryland
The Maryland Court of Appeals in applying :iits new
statute on this point in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
v. McBriety, 246 Md. 738, 230 A2d 81, held thait the trial
court's refusal to permit an employee of the insurer to
testify as to what the insurer would have done had the
insured answered the questions in the application correctly was prejudicial error. It also held that when the
materiality is shown by uncontradicted evidence, the misrepresentation is material as a matter of law.

Idaho
In Matthews v. New York Life Insurance Oo., supra,
a case involving the current statute, the Supreme Court
of Idaho held that the testimony of the insurer's representative suggested a potentially ambiguous and flexible
policy in determining whom it would insure in contracts
such as the one in issue·, and therefore, the issue of materiality should be resolved by the trier of the facts.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Industrial Indemnity
Co. v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 93 Ida. 59; 454 P 2d 956, held,
among other things, that the insurer was not entitled
to rescission of an automobile liability policy for misrepresentaJtions because "there is nothing in the record
to indicate that Industrial Indemnity would not have
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insured Stanley Zwiogart if the true facts had been
known."
Our research has not disclosed a case in any other
of the above listed states, or Puerto Rico, permitting
the "prudent insurer" test under the language of rthe new
statute, except Mass. Mutual Life Insura-nce Co. v. Allen,
416 P 2d 935, (Okla 1965). That case involved a policy
issued in March 1959 and was governed by the new Oklahoma statute, 36 0.S. 1961 Sec. 3609, enacted in 1957,
substantially the same as 31-19-8 U.C.A. 1953, as amended
in 1963.
In that case the insurer's medical director testified
that, under the underwriting manual of the company,
the policy would not have been issued if the true facts
had been disclosed in the application.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted the new
statute and said, at page 938, Pac. Rep. :
"36 0.S. 1961, Sec. 3609, was enacted in 1957 and
appears to have been taken from Arizona's Insurance Code (Arizona Revised Statutes Sec. 201109), which was enacted b>· that state in 1954.
We have found no case from the Arizona court
or this court wherein this section has been construed, and none has be'en cited."

At page 940 the Court quoted from 29 Am. J ur.,
Insurance Se0tion 701, and then said, at page 941:
"The test is
insurance companies generally would have rejected the application."
18

In reviewing that case, it is particularly important
to note the Court's comment that Oklahoma's new statute
was taken from the Arizona Insurance Code, and that
no Arizona ca8e construing the language had been found.
In a later decision the Court of Appeals of Arizona did
construe the language totally differently from the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the Allen case.
In Continental Cw·maUy Co. v. llhtlligan, supra, the Arizona Court held :
"'l'he uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony
of defendant's chief undenniter clearly showed
the established underwriting standards and practices of the defendant, and that under these es:tablished underwriting standards and practices, the
policies vvould not have been is8ued to an applicant
for insurance who had shown a series of excessive
blood pres8ure readings, as did plain!tiff. In view
of this testimony, the materiality of plaintiff's
mi8represen ta tions and nondisclosures cannot
seriously be questioned. Testimony of defendant's
underwriter
ven· specific as to the past practices and establislwd standards of defendant, and
did not constitute mere conclusionary statements."
The Oklahoma opinion relied solely on the old 29
Am. Jur., Insurance, reference. Had the Mulliga.n case
been decided in Arizona prior to the Allen case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court would probably have followed
the opinion construing the language of the Arizona
statute. The Oklahoma decision made no attempt to construe the language of the statute whereas the Arizona
Court considered and df>cided the effect of the revised
statutory provisions.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that, regardless of its final
decision on the merits of the case, this Court should hold
that the "individual insurer" test must be applied in
establishing materiality of misrepresentations in the application for insurance under Section 31-19-8, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended in 1963. To hold othenvise would ignore
the plain language of the statute and would be contrary
to the weight of authority and the well reasoned cases.
Respectfully submitted,
WALLACE D. HURD

Attorney for the Equitable Life
Assitrancc Society of the United
States
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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